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ABSTRACT 
 
Constrained Firms, Not Subsistence Activities: Evidence on 
Capital Returns and Accumulation in Peruvian Microenterprises* 
 
We investigate the returns to capital and capital accumulation using panel data of Peruvian 
micro enterprises (MEs). Marginal returns to capital are found to be very high at low levels of 
capital, but rapidly decreasing at higher levels. The dynamic analyses of capital accumulation 
in MEs suggest that credit constraints explain a major part of the variation in firm growth. We 
find a very large positive effect of household non-business wealth on capital stocks of MEs. 
We also show a sizable effect of risk on accumulation and pronounced interactions between 
wealth and risk. The presented evidence is consistent with poorly endowed entrepreneurs 
who operate in imperfect capital markets and a very risky environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Income from microenterprises (MEs) constitutes the main livelihood of the growing number 
of poor urban dwellers in developing countries. It is widely assumed that some of these MEs 
may not realize their full earnings potential due to limited access to credit. This assumption 
provides the rationale for a key policy intervention towards MEs, micro-credit programs. 
Several empirical studies have found very high marginal returns to capital in MEs in poor 
countries – typically well above market interest rates, and in some studies highest at very 
low levels of capital stock (Fafchamps et al., 2011; Grimm, Krüger, and Lay, 2011; Kremer, 
Lee, and Robinson, 2010; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006; Udry and Anagol, 2006). This 
finding hints indeed at credit constraints as one major obstacle to firm growth. Otherwise, a 
profit-maximizing entrepreneur would increase the capital stock until marginal returns 
equalize the market interest rate. Empirical work that explicitly addresses credit constraints 
also confirms their importance (De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2008; De Mel, McKenzie, 
and Woodruff, 2012; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008). Yet, credit constraints may only partly 
explain the observed high returns to capital. In fact, the persistence of small-scale activities 
in many poor countries is difficult to reconcile with very high returns to capital only caused 
by credit constraints. Successful entrepreneurs should be able and willing to re-invest a part 
of their high returns into their ME, thereby overcoming credit constraints and accumulating 
capital (as shown, for example, by Tybout, 1983). Risk may be the reason why this is not the 
case, as optimal capital stocks may be much lower than in less risky environments. The 
empirical literature generally has difficulties in the operationalization of risk and risk 
attitudes, which may explain why so far empirical research on the role of risk for ME 
performance is scarce. An exception is De Mel et al. (2008) who do, however, not find any 
sizeable effect of risk on returns to capital. Nevertheless, there is indirect evidence of the 
role of risk, such as the high rates of churning among informal MEs in developing countries 
(Mead and Liedholm, 1998).  
This paper aims at providing new empirical insights on the returns to capital, and the 
dynamics of small-scale activities in developing countries. We use a unique panel dataset of 
Peruvian MEs covering the period 2002 to 2006. The analysis of the ME sector is particularly 
relevant in the case of Peru, as these firms account for about 75 percent of employment in 
this country. Even during the impressive growth period covered by our panel, with growth 
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averaging 5.7 percent per annum, there has been no decline in employment in MEs. To test 
whether we can confirm previous findings of high returns for MEs, we first estimate 
production functions. In addition, we use this step to compute total factor productivities and 
an idiosyncratic risk proxy. We then examine capital accumulation. Our main contribution is 
hence to complement the static investigation of high returns to capital by a dynamic analysis 
of the determinants of capital accumulation. The focus will be on two fundamental 
constraints to capital growth in MEs, credit constraints and risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section provides a brief 
overview of previous evidence on ME performance and the constraints they face. In Section 
three, we present some theoretical considerations. Section four describes the dataset and 
the basic characteristics of Peruvian micro-entrepreneurs and their enterprises. Section five 
presents our empirical setup and discusses the results. The final section summarizes our 
main findings and concludes. 
 
2. Previous evidence  
There is now quite some evidence for very high returns to capital in small-scale activities in 
developing countries (De Mel, McKenzie, Woodruff, 2008; Fafchamps et al., 2011; Grimm, 
Krüger and Lay, 2011; Kremer, Lee, and Robinson, 2010; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006; 
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; Udry and Anagol, 2006). De Mel et al. (2008), for instance, 
perform an experiment in which they randomly provide cash or in-kind transfers to Sri 
Lankan MEs. The authors find, at least for male entrepreneurs, marginal returns to capital in 
a range from 55 to 70 percent per year. Consistent with credit market constraints, the 
marginal returns to capital are lower (higher) for wealthier (poorer) entrepreneurs. No 
significant differences in marginal returns between risk-averse and less risk-averse 
entrepreneurs can be detected. In a similar experiment in Mexico, McKenzie and Woodruff 
(2008) also provide evidence of very high returns of at least 20–33 percent a month. Returns 
are – with up to 100 percent monthly – highest among firms with capital stocks near $200 
that report being financially constrained. At least for this selected group, there is hence a 
strong indication for credit market imperfections causing high returns at low levels of 
capital.i 
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Whereas these fairly recent empirical studies focus on returns to capital and their causes, 
there is a separate strand of the literature that examines the patterns of entry, exit, and 
growth of MEs. Mead and Liedholm (1998) summarize the findings of a research project on 
ME behavior which draws (partly) on panel datasets from a number of developing countries. 
The authors typically find high rates of churning among MEs, with survival being positively 
associated with firm age, smaller initial size and past growth. The analysis of firm growth 
shows that MEs, which were smaller at start-up, tend to grow more rapidly than their larger 
counterparts. Moreover, young firms grow faster.ii These results are similar to those 
obtained by Fajnzilber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2006) using Mexican data. These 
authors find that size and time in business are negatively related to exit and growth. They 
conclude that MEs in Mexico show dynamic patterns consistent with a number of standard 
results from the theoretical literature on firm dynamics.  
While Mead and Liedholm (1998) and Fajnzilber et al. (2006) describe quite well some 
dynamic features of MEs in developing countries, they have little to say on the causes of 
differences in behavior.iii Few studies explicitly show the impact of capital constraints on 
accumulation. One exception is a study about the garment industry in Tirupur in Southern 
India by Banerjee and Munshi (2004). The authors find large and systematic differences in 
the level of capital stock in firms owned by people from two different community groups. 
This finding may be attributed to differences in access to capital between the groups. One of 
them, the Gounders, comes from a relatively wealthy agricultural community that was the 
first to move into the garment industry in Tirupur. Banerjee and Munshi (2004) argue that 
the incumbent Gounders start their businesses with much higher levels of capital stock than 
comparable outsiders because of their stronger ties to the local community, and the 
associated better access to finance. Both groups accumulate capital over time, but the 
outsiders do so much faster to catch up with the Gounders after approximately seven 
years.iv  
Recent work by de Mel et al. (2012) – again based on the sample of Sri Lankan MEs – 
examines the long-term effects of a (randomly assigned) transfer of cash or capital. Tracking 
MEs over a period of 4.5 to 5.5 years they show that these transfers lead to permanently 
higher capital stocks and, accordingly, higher profits in treated MEs. De Mel et al. (2012) 
interpret these findings as an indication of tight credit constraints. Yet, the lack of re-
investment of profits by the control group suggests that other factors must be at work as 
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well. De Mel et al. (2012) point at behavioral factors, in particular the lack of self-control and 
time-inconsistent preferences, as a possible explanation why MEs do not accumulate capital 
– despite possibly high returns to investment.         
 
3. Theoretical considerations  
In this section, we briefly illustrate how credit constraints and risk explain the high returns to 
capital, as well as their possible impacts on capital accumulation. This allows us to derive 
some hypotheses which will be tested subsequently.  
Take a standard neoclassical production function 
   𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 ,𝛺𝑡),       (1) 
where Yt is production of firm i in period t, Kt and Lt are inputs of capital and labor, and tΩ is 
the efficiency level or total factor productivity (TFP). Firm indices have been suppressed for 
brevity. Under neoclassical assumptions on the production technology, returns to capital are 
higher at lower levels of capital. This leads to the question why the capital stock of MEs may 
be low.  
Assuming that the capital stock 𝐾𝑡  follows a standard accumulation function, it is 
consequently the start-up capital K0 plus the sum of all investments It-j minus depreciation. 
This yields: 
   𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝑑)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1      
        ⇔ 𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝑑)𝑡𝐾0 + ∑ (1 − 𝑑)𝑡−𝑗𝑡𝑗=1 𝐼𝑡−𝑗,    (2) 
where d denotes the depreciation rate. We further assume that K0 and It are determined by 
the following reduced form equations 
   𝐾0 = 𝐾(Ω0𝑒 ,𝑊0,𝑅0)       (3) 
   𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼(𝐾𝑡,Ω𝑡 ,𝑊𝑡,𝑅𝑡),      (4) 
where Ω0𝑒 is the expected productivity in t=0, Wt denotes the wealth level to proxy for credit 
constraints, and Rt is risk.  
In a simple neoclassical world without frictions, the start-up capital stock will be the optimal 
capital stock that needs to be maintained over time. It would be chosen to equate the 
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market interest rate to marginal returns to capital – given expected productivity (equation 
(3)). Yet, under credit constraints and in the presence of risk the start-up capital of firms may 
be lower. Information asymmetries and moral hazard that cause credit market failure are 
typically exacerbated in developing economies, and more so for MEs.v Informal 
entrepreneurs with different capacity to provide collateral may therefore face different costs 
of capital. This in turn implies that some entrepreneurs are not able to realize the desired 
(initial) capital stock.  
Similar to credit constraints, risk drives a wedge between market interest rates and marginal 
returns, as risk-averse entrepreneurs demand a risk premium on their invested capital stock. 
The reason for the lower capital stocks is not the capital cost that the entrepreneurs face, 
but the higher shadow value that risk-averse entrepreneurs attach to risky profits. 
Fafchamps (1999) notes that in such a risky environment without appropriate contract-
enforcing formal institutions, true business risk is likely to be compounded by opportunistic 
and contractual risk. The argument is that high exposure to risk makes it easy to falsely claim 
inability to comply with contractual obligations towards a business counterpart.vi 
Entrepreneurs adjust their capital stock over time (equation (4)). Very importantly, firms can 
overcome credit constraints by retaining earnings (Evans and Jovanovich, 1989; Cabral and 
Matá, 2003). Capital stocks would then be increasing with enterprise age. If a firm produces 
under a neoclassical production function, marginal returns to capital are higher at low levels 
of capital stock. For firms with sub-optimal levels of capital stocks incentives for investment 
are hence higher the smaller the capital stock. Similarly, incentives are stronger and the 
capacity to retain earnings higher, the more productive a firm is. Younger and more 
productive firms will consequently be able to accumulate faster.  
The dynamic implications of risk are more complex. In risky environments, risk-averse 
entrepreneurs require a risk premium on additional investment and may postpone it (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). Risk should then have a negative impact on capital accumulation. Yet, 
new information or learning may decrease uncertainty (Jovanovic, 1982). The risk premium 
will then decrease over time and accumulation will (ceteris paribus) be faster in older firms. 
Finally, risk and credit constraints interact. One important interaction may be that less 
wealthy and, hence, credit-constrained entrepreneurs may be more risk averse and, 
consequently, exhibit a lower propensity to invest. Generally, more risk averse 
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entrepreneurs value foregone investment due to credit constraints less (the shadow value of 
risky profits is lower for them). This implies that their incentives for additional investment 
out of withheld profits are also lower, and, ceteris paribus, their pace of capital 
accumulation lower. Furthermore, if firm owners face credit constraints and investments are 
partly irreversible, they may have strong motives for precautionary savings. Only when the 
level of precautionary savings is deemed comfortable enough, risky investments will be 
undertaken (Fafchamps and Pender, 1997; Fafchamps, 1999). Interaction between wealth 
and risk may also manifest themselves in (endogenous) time-inconsistent preferences. Very 
high discount rates are typically observed for low-wealth individuals in high-risk 
environments (Pender,1996; Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2008).vii 
The considerations above lead to the following hypotheses to be tested subsequently: (i) 
returns to capital are high in MEs – if these firms operate under credit constraints and risk; 
(ii) credit constraints and risk reduce initial capital stocks and result in a slower pace of 
capital accumulation; (iii) the impact of both risk and credit constraints on accumulation 
decreases with higher enterprise age. 
 
4. Data and ME characteristics 
We use data from the nationally representative Peruvian household survey (ENAHO) 
collected by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) between 2002 and 
2006. The ENAHO comprises around 20,000 households each year, and it entails a panel sub-
sample of about 5,000 to 6,000 households (again nationally representative) of which 55-80 
percent are re-visited in the following year (see Table A1 in the appendix).viii The survey 
provides detailed information on individual socio-demographic and employment 
characteristics. Individuals who are identified as independent workers or as employers (in 
principal or secondary employment), and who are not working in agriculture, livestock 
production, or forestry, are interviewed in an Informal Sector Module.ix This module 
captures the characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their production unit in MEs with up to 
ten employees. It also contains detailed information on input use and sales and the legal 
status of the firm as well as characteristics of employed workers. We restrict our analysis to 
individuals in urban areas, i.e. in cities with at least 4,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, we 
exclude ME observations with either missing or non-positive values for the variables used 
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(value-added, labor and capital), as well as MEs in the primary sector. The final dataset for 
estimation is an unbalanced panel of MEs with 2,825, 1,006, 439, 283, and 135 MEs, which 
we observe in one, two, three, four and five years, respectively. 
Table 1 illustrates the employment structure of the labor force in the panel sub-sample. The 
importance of the informal sector is remarkable, even compared to Latin American averages. 
More than a third of the Peruvian workforce is self-employed. Another almost 30 percent 
work as paid worker in informal firms, defined as firms without registration or written 
accounts, or as unpaid family workers. Compared to men, women are less likely to be wage-
employed and more often engaged as unpaid family worker.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Some basic characteristics of Peruvian MEs from the Informal Sector Module are highlighted 
in Table 2. MEs are typically very small with a mean firm size of 1.6 including the owner. 
Almost one third of the firms operate with the help of unpaid family members and only 12 
percent employ paid staff. The average enterprise age of about 8 years is higher than one 
might probably expect. The ME owner is, on average, 42 years old and has been to school for 
10 years. Almost half of the owners are female. Incomes from MEs are fairly low, with mean 
and median monthly value-added of about 150 and 90 US Dollar (USD).x The median capital 
stock of USD 80 suggests that most activities do not require much investment. On the other 
hand, a mean capital stock of USD 700 implies that some firms have relatively high capital 
stocks. Most MEs can be found in petty trading (38 percent) followed by transport (15 
percent), hotels and restaurants (13 percent), and other manufacturing & food (13 percent). 
The different industries are very heterogeneous in many characteristics, for example in 
capital stocks, gender-composition, or number of employees.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Data presented in Table 2 show that MEs are being established and closed at a substantial 
rate. Depending on the industry, new starts during the year account for 24-38 percent of all 
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existing firms. Similarly, of all observed firms between 26 and 42 percent close every year.xi 
Entry (as well as exit) rates are higher in sectors that require less capital. New firms start 
with a 30 percent lower median capital stock on average. Capital accumulation is quite 
heterogeneous as well; for example, MEs in wholesale/retail shops – on average – even 
reduce their capital stock (see Table 1). 
Figure 1 provides another indication that Peruvian MEs tend to adjust their capital stocks 
over time. Based on a sample of firms with a maximum age of three years when first 
observed, this figure shows the capital stock (year effects controlled) of MEs that can be 
found in the first and fourth quartile of the distribution of initial capital stocks, 
respectively.xii The initial difference in capital stocks between these two groups is very large. 
Firms in the fourth quartile start with a log capital stock that is almost four times higher than 
from those in the first quartile. This implies that the capital stock is more than 50 times 
higher in this group. Yet, MEs that start with lower capital stocks accumulate, while those 
with a high capital stock even tend to reduce their capital stocks. After 3 years, capital stocks 
in the two groups still differ significantly. Nevertheless, the log difference has reduced to 
about 2.5 implying that capital stocks in firms with high initial capital stocks are only about 
ten times larger than in the group that starts with low levels.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
5. Empirical analysis  
5.1 Capital returns  
We first estimate a production function to test whether we can find high returns to capital in 
Peruvian MEs. For estimation purposes we take a log-linear transformation of the 
production function (1): 
   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡      (5) 
   𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,        
with lower case letters referring to log values of value-added, labor, and capital of firm i at 
time t, respectively.xiii The error term uit may be decomposed into two components: 𝜀𝑖𝑡, an 
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i.i.d. error term and 𝜔𝑖 = ln(Ωi). To estimate the production function for each industry, a 
random effects (RE) panel model is employed. A RE regression gives unbiased estimates only 
if the individual effect 𝜔𝑖 influences value-added directly. However, it may also 
simultaneously determine input factor use which may bias our coefficients. Multiple ways to 
address the simultaneity problem have been proposed, including a fixed effects (FE) 
estimator, semiparametric proxy estimators and GMM system estimation. The latter 
requires at least three time periods, which is not feasible as it would reduce our sample by 
more than 60 percent. Similar problems plague the FE-estimator and the semiparametric 
proxy estimator proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (henceforth LP).  The 
semiparametric LP estimator uses within-plant changes in intermediate/electricity inputs as 
a proxy for productivity shocks. Unfortunately, about 15 percent (66 percent) of all MEs in 
our sample do not use intermediate (electricity) inputs, and would be excluded from the 
analysis. The FE estimator uses only the variation within firms over time. It is unbiased under 
the assumption of the unobserved firm-specific productivity being time-invariant. Yet, there 
are several weaknesses. Using only the within variation, coefficients reflect marginal 
productivities which implies that potential start-up costs are ignored. More importantly, FE-
estimators perform poorly in short panels, a feature which is well known in the literature. As 
the within-variation tends to be much lower than the cross-sectional variation, FE-
coefficients are often weakly identified, and consequently biased towards zero. This problem 
is aggravated by measurement error. All of these factors should result in a strong downward 
bias of the estimates. Hence, we opt for applying the FE and LP estimators only as a 
robustness check (results provided in section 5.3). 
Table 3 presents the production function estimates as well as the implied marginal returns 
to capital. The estimated coefficients are very much in line with previous studies with a log 
labor coefficient in the range between 0.5 and 0.7, and a log capital coefficient between 0.1 
and 0.2.xiv There is quite some sectoral variation, in particular in the capital coefficient. The 
differences in the sector specific R2s also suggest that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the 
within sector variance of returns, probably partly driven by differences in the extent of 
reporting errors. The output-capital elasticity is highest in manufacturing (0.22) and lowest 
in petty trading (0.08). With an average of 14 percent, monthly returns to capital are very 
high, but also very heterogeneous. In the most capital intensive sector transport the returns 
are rather low with only 2 percent, while they amount to 80 percent in the least capital 
12 
 
intensive sector construction. If an entrepreneur invests an additional USD 10 USD into her 
ME, monthly income increases by USD 6.8 in construction, and only by USD 0.2 in transport. 
To relate these results on marginal returns to income levels of the entrepreneurs: At mean 
value-added and capital stock these marginal returns would correspond to a permanent 
income gain of 6 percent in construction, but only 0.1 percent in transport. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Figure 2 presents the returns to capital as a function of the capital stock based on the 
estimates presented in Table 3 (for all industries). Except for the capital stock, we take mean 
values in all other variables. As previous studies, our analysis of returns to capital in Peruvian 
MEs shows very high marginal returns to capital that decline rapidly as firms accumulate 
capital. Yet, in a range up to 130 USD of capital stock marginal returns are well above 10 
percent monthly. More than 57 percent of MEs can be found in this range and may hence be 
able to realize these returns if provided the necessary capital. As laid out above, the lack of 
credit may, however, not be the single reason for low capital stocks and unexploited 
opportunities. Risk may also cause lower investment and hence lower capital stocks.   
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
5.2 Capital accumulation 
In this section, we attempt to identify the factors that restrict capital accumulation. In 
accordance with our theoretical considerations, we first examine the determinants of the 
start-up capital stock. The investment equation (3) then takes the following functional form: 
   𝑘i0 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2Ω𝑖𝑡𝑒 + 𝜇3𝑊i0 + 𝜇4𝑅i0 + 𝜇5𝑅i0𝑊i0 + 𝑒i0,   (6) 
In a second step, we analyze the accumulation behavior:       
   Δ 𝑘𝑖𝑡 = ρ0𝑘𝑖𝑡 + ρ1 + ρ2Ω𝑖𝑡 + ρ3𝑊𝑖𝑓 + ρ4𝑅𝑖𝑡 + ρ5𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑓 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.  (7) 
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All variables are defined as before, ei0 is an error term, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the combined error term. 
Capital growth Δ 𝑘𝑖𝑡 is measured as the change in log capital (𝑘𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡). The term  𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑓 
is the interaction between risk and wealth (from the first observed period in business). We 
now briefly discuss the key right-hand-side variables and how we proxy them: credit 
constraints, productivity, and risk. Their distributions as well as means and standard 
deviations are presented in Figure A1 in the appendix. 
The expected productivity is proxied by owner’s age and its square, years of education, and a 
dummy for male entrepreneurs. In equation (7), productivity Ω𝑖𝑡 is measured as the time 
invariant residual 𝜔𝑖 obtained by a RE estimation of the production function (5).  
Credit constraints are proxied by the wealth level 𝑊𝑖𝑓 of the household, as household assets 
may serve as collateral for credit. The household wealth index is derived from the first 
principal component of a set of indicators of ownership of household assets. The latter 
include only non-business assets, such as color televisions and the condition of the house, 
for example the state of the walls and the quality of sanitary facilities. Household wealth, 
however, may be correlated with unobservable characteristics, such as entrepreneurial 
ability or motivation, which also affect the start-up capital stock and growth. This correlation 
is likely to be positive implying an upward bias of the estimated coefficient. This potential 
bias should be somewhat reduced by including the above proxies (age, education, gender) 
for expected productivity in equation (6) and the productivity measure in equation (7). 
Possible problems of reverse causality are addressed in equation (7) by using for the wealth 
index the information on asset ownership provided in the first observed period in business 
(𝑊𝑖𝑓). 
Risk is difficult to operationalize. Yet, we propose to construct a series of proxies. First, we 
measure risk by the variation of sales, a “classical” proxy for risk. We compute this variation 
at the sector level with sectors being disaggregated as finely as possible while keeping the 
number of observations in each sector cell at least at 30. To this end, we use the pooled 
cross-sectional sample with almost four times as many observations that allows for a finer 
disaggregation. Such a procedure yields 85 sector cells, for which we compute the 
coefficients of variation in sales.  
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Second, we propose to measure idiosyncratic risk using the time-variant component from 
the FE estimation of equation (5). More specifically, we construct a measure of exposure to 
risk RESi from the residual 𝜀𝑖𝑡: 
    𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖 =  ∑ |𝜀𝑖𝑡|/𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑡=1 ,      (8) 
where Ti refers to the number of periods, in which we observe the ME i.xv This measure, 
based on average absolute time-variant FE residuals, reflects only firm-specific volatility in 
value-added observed over the lifespan of the ME.xvi It captures the ex-ante effects of 
anticipated shocks and cyclical effects as well as possibly non-anticipated ex-post effects of 
shocks. We argue above that we prefer RE over FE since the latter performs poorly in short 
panels and the coefficients are downward biased. This implies an overestimation of the 
productivity level 𝜔𝑖 and, more importantly, a strong correlation with the input factors. Yet, 
it is difficult to say whether and how this bias affects the time-variant residuals. By definition 
these residuals sum up to zero for each firm. Their estimated variance may, however, be 
overestimated, for example if too much of possible anticipated cyclical effects now enter 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
in particular since labor coefficients are underestimated. To guard against the importance of 
such effects we test whether 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is correlated with input use; and it turns out that this 
correlation is very low (<0.05).  
Third, we can average RESi at the sector-level (49 sector cells, if only the panel data is used). 
Fourth, we use the share of entrepreneurs that are found to be unemployed, helping as 
unpaid family worker, or even leaving the labor force in the subsequent period to construct 
a sector-specific involuntary exit rate (45 sector cells of the panel).xvii Except RESi all risk 
proxies are measured at the sector level, and are constant over time. We opt for using 
sector-cells rather than sector-year cells to measure sector-specific risk. This permanent risk 
measure is constant over time, and it is likely to be more relevant than temporary risk shocks 
for investment decisions. Moreover, it allows a finer sector disaggregation. 
We report the pairwise correlations of these risk proxies in Table A2 in the appendix. In line 
with expectations, all correlations are positive. It is difficult to judge which of these 
imperfect proxies is most adequate; and they may be capturing different dimensions of 
business risk. Due to the correlation between the single proxies they cannot be included 
jointly in a regression. From a combination of these proxies, we therefore propose to 
construct a risk proxy using principal components analysis (see Table A2 in the appendix). 
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The first principal component that we will use as risk proxy in the subsequent analysis 
explains about 38 percent of the “total variance” in the four variables (53 percent without 
the idiosyncratic RESi).  
With our right-hand side variables specified, we now analyze the determinants of the start-
up capital stock. The first column of Table 4 presents the OLS estimation results of equation 
(6). The sample is restricted to start-up MEs defined as being owned by entrepreneurs who 
did not have a firm in the previous year. In line with the theoretical considerations, asset-rich 
entrepreneurs start with a considerably higher capital stock. An increase in the wealth level 
by 1 standard deviation raises the capital stock by 46 percent from 60 to 88 USD for a 
hypothetical ME with mean values. Risk is associated with a lower initial capital stock.xviii If 
the risk exposure of our hypothetical firm decreases by 1 standard deviation, its capital stock 
is 90 percent higher and amounts to 114 USD. Furthermore, the interaction term of wealth 
and the risk proxy has a positive coefficient, i.e. at higher levels of wealth the negative 
effects of risk are mitigated. An alternative reading would be that credit constraints are less 
binding in risky environments where risk-averse entrepreneurs attach less value to foregone 
profits.  
The second and third columns present the results from the RE accumulation regression.xix 
The most important factor appears to be the pre-investment capital stock, i.e. small MEs 
grow considerably faster. An increase in the capital stock by 1 percent leads to an 
approximate decrease of the growth rate of 0.5 percentage points. As expected, productivity 
also fosters accumulation, an increase by 1 standard deviation results in an increase of the 
growth rate by 13 percentage points. Young firms appear to grow faster with a turning point 
at a relatively high enterprise age of 28 years. , This is in line with previous evidence and may 
be partly due to depreciation of a capital stock that is not being renewed or replaced (Mead 
and Liedholm, 1998; Faijnzilber et al., 2006). These (pure) age effects are rather small; the 
growth rate of an ME declines by about 3 percentage points with one additional year of 
existence. 
In contrast, the effects of credit constraints and risk on investment tend to be very large. 
Both coefficients are highly significant and the implied effects sizable: An increase in the 
wealth level by 1 standard deviation raises the growth rate by 33 percentage points. If risk 
decreases by 1 standard deviation, the growth rate is 39 percentage points higher ceteris 
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paribus.xx The interaction term between risk and wealth has the expected positive sign, a 
finding consistent with more wealthy entrepreneurs being less risk averse. Comparing an 
entrepreneur with average wealth to a wealthy (average plus 1 standard deviation) 
entrepreneur, the increase in the growth rate due to a risk reduction by 1 standard deviation 
drops by a third. 
Finally, we include interactions between enterprise age and the constraint proxies (last 
column of Table 4). The effects are as expected. The coefficient of the risk index alone 
increases and we also find evidence of this effect being reduced slowly over time (only after 
51 years it reduces to zero). Similarly, the impact of wealth is stronger and we find a 
negative wealth age interaction (after 55 years the wealth effect reduces to zero).   
Summing up, both risk and credit constraints are key factors for explaining low initial capital 
stocks and slow capital accumulation in MEs. This suggests that these factors are also behind 
the high returns to capital that we observe at low levels of capital.  The “mitigating” effect of 
wealth in the presence of risk may point at an important role of behavioral factors (high 
discount rates, lack of self-control) for investment decisions. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5.3 Robustness 
We first provide some robustness checks for our production function estimates and the 
corresponding estimated returns to capital. Then, we examine the robustness of the results 
on accumulation with a focus on the effects of risk. 
Table 5 presents the LP and FE estimates of the above production function. The LP 
coefficients on capital are very similar to the RE coefficients, but the labor coefficients are 
significantly lower. This gives us some confidence that the RE estimates on the capital 
coefficients are not upward biased, and the returns to capital stated in Table 3 are reliable. 
Both the FE coefficients on labor and capital are very low, probably reflecting their 
downward bias due to weak identification and measurement error.  
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[Table 5 about here] 
 
In general, measurement error of both profits and capital tends to bias the estimated 
coefficients towards zero, so this source of bias does not give rise to major concerns in light 
of the significant strong effects. Moreover, we dropped influential outliers, as explained 
above. It is difficult to judge whether and how measurement error changes with higher or 
lower levels of profits and capital stock. We think there is little reason to assume that 
measurement error is less pronounced at lower levels of capital stocks, which would then 
partly explain higher returns at lower levels of capital. 
Additional biases may arise from systematic firm exit. ME activities with low levels of capital 
stock are likely to be more vulnerable to shocks.xxi This bias should be less pronounced in our 
estimates, as we use an unbalanced panel. Nevertheless, we test for selection effects by first 
estimating the following equation for firm survival: 
   𝑃(Survival𝑖𝑡 = 1) = F(θ𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡),    (9) 
where Zit is a vector of variables that proxy productivity (owner’s age and its square, years of 
education, a dummy indicating male entrepreneurs). The term 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a vector of variables 
that identify survival (see below). We estimate this equation as a simple probit. To correct 
for the selection problem, we then include the inverse of the mill’s ratio in the augmented 
production function: 
   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑍𝑖𝑡 + ϕϕ(𝜃�𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝜂�𝑍𝑖𝑡+𝜏�𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡)Φ(𝜃�𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝜂�𝑍𝑖𝑡+𝜏�𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,   (10) 
where ϕ denotes the standard normal pdf, and Φ is the standard normal cdf. The difficulty is 
to find variables that explain survival/exit, but are not correlated with value-added. We use a 
dummy indicating whether the entrepreneur is 60 years or older, and the number of small 
children in a household (less than one year old). That both variables may indeed be 
associated with involuntary business closure is supported by both instruments being jointly 
significant at the 10 percent level (not shown).xxii In the production function estimates the 
inverse of the mill’s ratios are not significant. Although the capital coefficient is indeed 
slightly higher once we control for selection, the difference is not significant (not shown). In 
contrast, the inverse of the mill’s ratios are significant in the growth equation. Once we 
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control for selection, small firms still grow considerably faster; however, the coefficient is 
slightly smaller, but not significantly different from the results presented above (not shown).  
Another potential concern may be the validity of our risk measure that we construct from a 
combination of imperfect proxies (variation of sales, involuntary exit rate, idiosyncratic risk, 
and the latter aggregated at the sector level).  As robustness check we therefore included 
each proxy separately and all proxies jointly in the estimations. In equations (6) and (7) all 
proxies – when included one by one – enter with the expected negative sign and are highly 
significant (Table A3 in the appendix). Once they are jointly included, only the idiosyncratic 
risk measure becomes insignificant in equation (7). In the estimation of equation (6) one 
proxy, idiosyncratic risk within the sector, changes the sign, but is insignificant. These tests 
give us quite some confidence that our risk measure indeed provides an adequate summary 
measure of business risks.  With respect to the size of the effects of risk, the inclusion of six 
industry dummies into equations (6) and (7) provides an important additional robustness 
check, as most risk proxies are constructed at the sector level and may therefore also 
capture other sectoral effects.xxiii Not surprisingly, the effects of risk are being reduced and 
may be considered a lower bound estimate (see Table A4 in the appendix). This estimate still 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in the risk measure leads to a reduction of 
start-up capital and the growth rate by 16 percent and 15 percentage points respectively. 
The coefficient and its interaction with wealth remain highly significant, whereas the 
interaction with enterprise age becomes insignificant.xxiv  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze returns to capital and capital stock dynamics of MEs using a panel 
dataset from Peru. We first compute marginal returns to capital based on a random effects 
estimation of a ME production function. As many previous studies, we find very high 
marginal returns – on average about 14 percent monthly – at low levels of capital, but these 
marginal returns decrease rapidly at higher levels. Yet, in a range up to 130 USD of capital 
stock marginal returns are well above 10 percent monthly. More than 57 percent of MEs can 
be found in this range and may hence be able to realize these returns if provided the 
necessary capital. This result is very robust, as shown by the estimation of a number of 
alternative specifications. The main empirical part of the paper then examines why capital 
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stocks remain low and why MEs do not accumulate, for example by re-investing those high 
returns. Our analysis of the determinants of start-up capital and subsequent capital 
accumulation confirms the well-established finding in the literature that credit constraints 
explain a major part of the variation in firm growth. We find a very large effect of household 
non-business wealth on capital stocks of MEs. An increase in the wealth level by one 
standard deviation raises the growth rate of MEs by 33 percentage points. While the positive 
effect of wealth is a standard finding, it provides an interesting benchmark for the effects of 
risk that the present study – in our view – can show more convincingly than previous studies. 
We find risk to lead to considerably lower capital stocks and a slow process of capital 
accumulation. The effect is again sizable with a lower bound estimate that corresponds to 15 
percentage points reduction in the growth rate for a one standard deviation increase in our 
preferred risk proxy. That MEs’ investment decisions are heavily influenced by considering 
risks, is supported by pronounced interactions between wealth and risk. The presented 
evidence is consistent with poorly endowed entrepreneurs who operate in imperfect capital 
markets and a very risky environment. Hence, these entrepreneurs forego profitable 
investments, as they have to withhold liquidity and/or have very high discount rates. The 
“pure” risk effects may be efficient individual responses to prevailing business risks when 
insurance markets fail. However, the significant interaction between wealth and risk show 
that capital market imperfections reinforce the negative effect of risk on accumulation.  This 
is an indication of important inefficiencies and unexploited potential in MEs caused by risk 
and credit constraints. However, this paper has little to say on how precisely this mechanism 
works and more research seems to be warranted that addresses these behavioral questions. 
In general, the findings once again illustrate the great heterogeneity of informal activities 
(Cunningham and Maloney, 2001). While these activities may appear residual activities 
pursued for subsistence at first sight, the dynamics of an important part – if not the majority 
of the entrepreneurs in the Peruvian context – can be better described by theories of the 
firm; yet, of firms that operate under severe constraints. From a policy perspective, these 
results imply that credit constraints and risk leave the potential of many small-scale 
entrepreneurs unexploited. How these constraints can be overcome is difficult to say on the 
basis of our results. Of course, the strong effects of wealth provide a rationale for 
microcredit, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to judge whether efficient modes can be 
found to allocate capital to MEs in these small quantities. Access to simple savings accounts 
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with light credit lines might be a possible solution. Savings accounts may also mitigate the 
effects of risk that we have identified. Whether such a measure will be effective in reducing 
the adverse effects of risk, however, depends on the precise nature of risks. In this regard, it 
is worth stressing that some risk is inherent to any business activity. This is also why more 
research into how – possibly excessive – risk leads to sub-optimal investment decisions. 
Moreover, there is scope to analyze how household-related risks, for example health shocks, 
affect investment decisions. If these risks mattered, providing corresponding insurance, for 
example health and life insurance, may enhance capital accumulation in MEs. Both the 
determinants of ME investment behavior and the effectiveness and efficiency of specific 
policies are hence pertinent research questions since small-scale activities are likely to 
remain the main income source of the world’s poor in decades to come. 
 
Appendix 
[Table A1 about here] 
 
[Table A2 about here] 
 
[Table A3 about here] 
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[Figure A1 about here] 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Structure of employment in Peru (in percent) 
  Total Male Female 
Wage employment 48.70 53.25 43.05 
     of which in informal 
firms (%) 39.96 41.56 36.27 
Self-employment  or 
Employer 36.16 34.28 38.49 
Unpaid family work 7.99 5.54 11.04 
Unemployed 7.15 6.99 7.36 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the panel sub-sample from ENAHO. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of MEs by industry 
 Industries All 
M.& 
food Constr. 
W./R. 
shops 
Petty 
trad. H.& R. Tran. 
Oth. 
serv. 
   ME characteristics 
Employees 0.63 0.82 0.65 1.12 0.68 0.91 0.13 0.45 
Self-employed (%) 63.2 59.8 64.5 45.2 55.9 46.2 91.0 78.3 
With paid employees (%) 12.1 21.3 31.5 36.7 5.8 12.2 7.7 11.1 
With unpaid employees (%) 31.4 32.7 20.5 39.5 41.2 49.7 4.1 16.4 
Monthly value-added (mean) 153 148 166 305 134 135 165 168 
Monthly value-added (median) 90 81 129 190 72 74 133 76 
Capital (mean) 697 823 127 962 217 192 2396 691 
Capital (median) 83 115 23 153 41 65 1610 111 
Capital (median) (new MEs)  58 65 26 227 29 46 1251 37 
Enterprise age  7.9 11.7 11.6 9.7 7.8 6.0 5.7 6.4 
Entry rate (%) 29.4 30.4 37.9 24.0 25.4 33.8 26.9 39.0 
Exit rate (%) 32.0 34.1 41.6 25.8 26.6 33.0 31.9 46.0 
   Owner’s characteristics 
Gender: Male (%) 52.1 55.5 99.8 84.0 31.7 12.3 99.8 64.6 
Owner’s age 41.9 44.7 42.5 40.0 43.3 43.9 37.2 38.2 
Owner’s years of schooling  10.5 10.5 10.4 11.3 9.8 9.1 11.2 12.7 
Observations 7960 1026 454 281 2995 1051 1194 959 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the panel sub-sample from ENAHO.  
Notes: Industries are other manufacturing & food, construction, wholesale/retail shops, petty trading, hotels 
and restaurants, transport, and other services. Monetary values are in constant Dec. 2001 Nuevo Sols (using 
the INEI Consumer Price Index) and converted into US-$ using the Dec. 2001 nominal exchange rate. 
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Table 3: Production function estimates for Peruvian industries 
 Industries All M.& food Constr. 
W./R. 
shops 
Petty 
trad. H.& R. Tran. Oth. serv. 
Log labor 0.605*** 0.619*** 0.642*** 0.697*** 0.582*** 0.690*** 0.486*** 0.558*** 
SE (0.015) (0.036) (0.045) (0.066) (0.028) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
Log capital 0.118*** 0.220*** 0.141*** 0.104*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 
SE (0.005) (0.015) (0.026) (0.029) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014) (0.016) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Outlier+ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Average K 84 87 23 150 39 57 1115 83 
Average Y 101 78 127 228 93 101 150 76 
Average Y/K 8.8 7.2 16.1 6.2 12.2 5.3 1.7 10.1 
M. returns 0.143 0.198 0.774 0.159 0.191 0.136 0.019 0.131 
R2 overall 0.39 0.57 0.47 0.49 0.25 0.45 0.34 0.38 
N 7857 1012 444 274 2952 1039 1170 944 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENAHO panel-subsample.                       
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. + In all regressions, we drop 
influential outliers from our sample (and sub-samples) that we identify by the DFITS-statistic obtained from a 
precedent OLS regression (See Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980).  We use a cut-off-value |𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆| = 3�k/N, 
with k, the degrees of freedom (plus 1) and N, the number of observations. This reduces the sample by 1-2 
percent. Marginal returns to capital 𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝐾
= 𝛾 ∗ 𝑌
𝐾
 are evaluated at Y=exp(mean(log Y)) and K=exp(mean(log K)). 
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Table 4: Estimated functions of start-up capital and accumulation 
Dependent variable: start-up k  Δ  k 
Log capital   -0.468*** -0.475*** 
    (0.019) (0.019) 
Wealth index 0.184*** 0.138*** 0.165*** 
  (0.031) (0.015) (0.020) 
Risk index++ -0.507*** -0.256*** -0.305*** 
  (0.052) (0.028) (0.036) 
Wealth * Risk index++ 0.043** 0.037*** 0.033*** 
  (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) 
Enterprise age   -0.028*** -0.028*** 
    (0.009) (0.009) 
Enterprise age^2   0.001*** 0.001** 
    (2.3 * 10^-4) (2.5 * 10^-4) 
TFP   0.235*** 0.234*** 
    (0.062) (0.061) 
   Enterprise age * Risk index   
 
0.006* 
    
 
(0.003) 
   Enterprise age * wealth   
 
-0.003* 
    
 
(0.001) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Outlier controlled+ Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.234 
 
  
R2 overall   0.195 0.203 
N 1170 2443 2435 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENAHO panel-subsample.  
Notes: Regression of equation (6) include: a constant, age and its square, years of education, and a dummy 
indicating male entrepreneurs. Robust standard errors in parenthesis * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.+ In all 
regressions, we drop influential outliers according to the procedure explained under Table 3. ++ In the 
estimation presented in the first column, the risk index does not contain the idiosyncratic measure as it is only 
available for new firms that are observed in at least two periods. This would result in a strong selection and 
reduce our sample by two thirds.  
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Table 5: Robustness: LP and FE estimator of the production function.  
  Log labor   Log capital     
Method Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. N 
LP 0.386*** (0.013) 0.109*** (0.013) 6610 
FE 0.386*** (0.021) 0.042*** (0.010) 7857 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENAHO panel-subsample.  
Notes: LP estimates are obtained using the Stata procedure developed by Petrin, Poi, and Levinsohn (2004). LP 
standard errors (S.E.) are bootstrapped with 250 repl.; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. + In all regressions, we 
drop influential outliers according to the procedure explained under Table 3.  
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Table A1: Structure of the panel  
Year Hh. visited Hh. not 
interviewed 
Hh.  observed in 
previous period 
Hh. interviewed  
 
2002 6257 847 . 5410   
2003 4217 688 3068 3529   
2004 6490 1141 2787 5349   
2005 6778 1469 4146 5309   
2006 6593 1182 4496 5411   
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the panel sub-sample from ENAHO. 
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Table A2: Risk proxies, correlation matrix 
 Sales 
variation+++ 
exit rate+++ RES+++ RES Component 1 Component 1 
Sales variation+++ 1.000    0.548 0.540 
exit rate+++ 0.290*** 1.000   0.595 0.552 
RES+++ 0.311*** 0.330*** 1.000  0.588 0.590 
RES 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.165*** 1.000 - 0.235 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENAHO panel-subsample.  
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +++ Variable is measured at the sector level. The last columns on the 
right show the eigenvector associated to the first component (without and with the idiosyncratic risk). 
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Table A3: Risk proxies, regressions 
 
Dep. 
var.:  start-up k  Δ  k 
Sales  -0.55*** 
  
-0.49*** -0.21*** 
   
-0.15*** 
    var.° (0.056) 
  
(0.058) (0.037) 
   
(0.037) 
exit rate° 
 
-7.59*** 
 
-6.36***   -3.25*** 
  
-2.33*** 
  
 
(0.874) 
 
(0.878)   (0.513) 
  
(0.540) 
RES° 
  
-2.55** 1.24   
 
-4.07*** 
 
-2.32*** 
  
  
(1.062) (1.087)   
 
(0.635) 
 
(0.668) 
RES 
    
  
  
-0.20** -0.10 
  
    
  
  
(0.089) (0.091) 
R2 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.25           
R2 o. 
    
0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.20 
N 1171 1173 1174 1173 2446 2447 2450 2436 2435 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENAHO panel-subsample.  
Notes: Regressions include all additional explanatory variables which are contained in the main regressions of 
equation (6) and (7). In all regressions, we drop influential outliers according to the procedure explained in the 
note to Table 3. +++ Variable is measured at the sector level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. . 
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Table A4: Estimated functions of start-up capital and accumulation with industry dummies 
Dependent variable: start-up k  Δ  k 
Log capital   -0.554*** -0.555*** 
    (0.022) (0.022) 
Wealth index 0.199*** 0.157*** 0.181*** 
  (0.028) (0.016) (0.020) 
Risk index -0.140** -0.129*** -0.109*** 
  (0.065) (0.033) (0.040) 
Wealth * Risk 0.045** 0.026** 0.028*** 
  (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) 
Enterprise age   -0.025*** -0.023*** 
    (0.009) (0.009) 
Enterprise age^2   0.001** 4.5 * 10^-4* 
    (2.5 * 10^-4) (2.5 * 10^-4) 
TFP   0.263*** 0.267*** 
    (0.061) (0.061) 
   Enterprise age * risk   
 
-0.002 
    
 
(0.003) 
   Enterprise age * wealth   
 
-0.003** 
    
 
(0.001) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Outlier controlled+ Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.382 
 
  
R2 overall   0.241 0.246 
N 1170 2432 2426 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENAHO panel-subsample.  
Notes: Regressions include all variables stated under Table 4. + In all regressions, we drop influential outliers 
according to the procedure explained in a note to Table 3. Industry dummies represent all industries as in Table 
3 with petty trading as baseline. Robust standard errors in parenthesis * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1: Capital accumulation and reduction of young firms over time (sub-sample) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENAHO panel-subsample. 
Notes: The figure is based on a sub-sample including only young firms with a maximum age of three years old 
when first observed and that are observed in at least four periods.  
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Figure 2: Marginal returns for firms with an interquartile capital stock (p75 - p25) 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENAHO panel-subsample. 
Notes: Marginal returns at lower than p25 capital stocks are very high which would imply a wide y-axis scaling. 
In contrast, they are close to zero for higher capital stocks, and a maximum value of 32,000 USD would imply a 
wide x-axis scaling. For a better graphical understanding, we choose to display only the interquartile range. We 
predict the profit level given the capital stock and mean values in all other variables. Whereas the mean log 
labor is 5.34 for the whole sample, it is only 4.94 for firms with a capital stock in the first quartile of capital 
stock. This results in a slight overestimation the returns to capital at low levels. Returns to capital are proxied 
by (ΔY/ΔK) with ΔX = Xt – Xt-5. Results are robust to an extension of the lag length to 10 or 20. 
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Figure A1: Descriptives 
           Productivity, mean: 0, sd: 0.56    Wealth, mean: 0, sd: 2.06            
Risk, mean: 0, sd: 1.29     Initial risk, mean: 0, sd: 1.27
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Notes 
                                                 
i Similar evidence (for selected groups of entrepreneurs) is provided by Fafchamps et al. (2011). 
ii McPherson (1996) and Coad and Tamvada (2012), for example, show similar patterns for southern African and 
Indian firms, respectively. 
iii Fajnzylber et al. (2006) do present some suggestive evidence in favor of credit constraints. The authors 
regress employment growth on dummies for credit at start-up, and dummies for subsequent credit (and a set 
of other controls). Firms with start-up credit appear to grow slower given that they reach their optimal capital 
stocks more rapidly. In contrast, MEs with subsequent access to credit grow faster, as they can quickly adjust to 
their optimal capital stock. Yet, the authors acknowledge that this result might be driven by simultaneity. 
iv Further evidence for credit constraints is derived from exogenous (liquidity or credit availability) shocks on 
firm performance. Tybout (1983), for example, uses industry level data from Colombia. While favorable 
earnings shocks appear to be little relevant for large firms, these additional internal funds are used for 
investment by smaller firms. Banerjee and Duflo (2004) take advantage of a policy change in India that affected 
the flow of directed credit to estimate the effect of a favorable credit shock on investment and productivity of 
medium-sized firms. Their results show a large acceleration in the rate of growth of sales and profits due to the 
shock. In contrast, Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka (2006) cannot find a positive impact of credit access on the 
performance of small garment producers in Kenya. 
v Using data from the manufacturing sector in six African countries, Bigsten et al. (2003), for example, provide 
evidence that micro and small firms are much less likely to get a loan than large firms.  
vi The World Bank’s Doing Business dataset provides some information on credit availability as well as on the 
efficiency of contract enforcement (http://www.doingbusiness.org/). Whereas the percentage of individuals 
and firms listed by a private credit bureau amounts to 36 percent in Peru, it is 5 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
34 percent in Latin America, and 64 percent in OECD countries. The cost of contract enforcement amount to 36 
percent of a claim in Peru, compared to 50 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 31 percent in Latin America and 20 
percent in OECD countries.  
vii A related explanation for low accumulation is the lack of self-control, another behavioral patterns that has 
been observed in low income countries (Fafchamps et al., 2011; de Mel et al., 2012). 
viii In 2002, the survey took place during the 4th quarter (October to December). Starting from May 2003, the 
survey is permanent (the whole sample is distributed monthly along the year). Around 18 percent of the visited 
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households are not interviewed as the household refuses, is absent, the house is unoccupied or other reasons 
(miscellaneous category). This leads to an unbalanced panel with 719, 1435, 1153, 1870 and 2096 households 
being observed in one, two, three, four and five years, respectively. The fact that this number is increasing 
reflects increased effort by INEI to create a larger panel dataset. Quite a number of panel households were not 
interviewed in consecutive years. 
ix In urban areas, 10 percent of self-employed individuals work in agriculture, livestock production, or forestry, 
and are consequently not included in the Informal Sector Module. 
x All monetary values are converted into 2001 USD. See Notes of Table 2 for details. Value-added is the value of 
monthly sales plus self-consumed production minus expenses other than on labor and capital (i.e. expenses for 
intermediate inputs and electricity). 
xi We identify the firms by their owner. If a business is handed over from the owner to his wife, for example, 
this will be counted as business closure and opening. Consequently, our entry and exit rates may only be taken 
as an upper bound. However, these numbers are similar to those in Mead and Liedholm (1998) who find entry 
and exit rates in Sub-Sahara Africa ranging from 20-32 percent. Entry rates in their study are computed by 
dividing all new firms appearing in a given year by the number of firms in existence at the beginning of that 
year. Exit rates rely on retrospective information regarding business closure in the past year.  
xii More precisely, we follow Banerjee and Munshi (2004) by regressing the logarithm of capital on a full set of 
year dummies. We then plot the residual of this regression plus the mean value against time using local 
polynomial smoothing based on an epanechnikov kernel.  
xiii In the following, all monetary values are in 2001 USD (see Note under Table 2). 
xiv Westbrook and Tybout (1993), for example, analyze returns to scale in firms that are observed in up to 8 
years and have at least 10 employees in Chile. They find OLS log labor and log capital coefficients in most 
industries to be in the range between 0.7 and 0.9, and 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. Their within-plant estimates 
are in the range between 0.4 and 0.6, and 0.1 and 0.3, respectively. The authors argue that their OLS estimates 
appear to suffer from an upward bias while their within-plant estimates are likely to be downward biased, and 
identify measurement error in capital stocks to drive the latter result. This problem is certainly acerbated in our 
dataset covering microenterprises with fewer periods and up to 10 employees. 
xv The average Ti is 3.3.  
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xvi Using instead the time-variant residual from a RE model does not change the results. 
xvii Only entrepreneurs that are observed in the subsequent period can be classified as exiting or surviving, i.e. 
we do not have this information for the last round of the surveys and entrepreneurs in households that were 
dropped from the panel.  
xviii Here, the risk index does not contain the idiosyncratic measure as it is only available for new firms that are 
observed in at least two periods. This would reflect a strong selection and reduce our sample by two thirds. 
xix In section 5.1, we explain why we believe the RE model to be the best choice despite a potential bias due to 
the individual effect. Similarly, dynamic panel models may be biased if the individual effect is correlated with 
the control variables. However, our key variables are all time invariant, which makes FE-estimation, for 
example applying a bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable estimator (LSDV), not feasible. 
xx This numbers hold for firms with mean values. As wealth and risk are normalized the interaction term rules 
out. 
xxi If MEs with a high capital stock are more likely to tolerate productivity shocks and remain in business, the 
capital coefficient would be biased downwards. Firms with a low capital stock that experience an adverse shock 
may move out of business while those with a higher capital stock react by reducing capital. This would imply an 
upward bias in the growth rate of small firms as only surviving firms are considered. 
xxii Without ISit, identification relies on the nonlinearity of the inverse Mill’s ratio. We have used a number of 
alternative instruments (including the number of household members, number of wage earners, transfer 
incomes, household composition variables, loss of employment, severe illness, criminal act or natural disaster). 
However, all of these variables are either not significant in the selection equation, or highly significant in the 
production function regression (after including the inverse mill ratio).  
xxiii Sectors are disaggregated as finely as possible which means that they are not equivalent to common 
industry definitions (see for example Table 3). 
xxiv Other coefficients are not affected by the inclusion of sectoral dummies. 
 
 
 
